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"Anyone who is honestly seeking a job and can't find it deserves the
attention of the United States government and the people."
- John F Kennedy'A giant monster has arisen, one reminiscent of Frankenstein or
Godzilla. This monster, though, did not come from mad science
experiments or nuclear radiation-it emerged from a desire for
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more profit, and it feeds off social dumping grounds.2 Meet the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 3 Born in 1994,4 NAFTA
gets hungrier every year. While it purports to encourage economic
growth through free trade between the United States, Mexico, and Ca-
nada,5 in reality NAFTA exploits poor people in North America-partic-
ularly in Mexico-and perpetuates a social model doomed to self-
implode. Judging by the escalating rampant violence in Mexico, 6 the de-
struction is well under way and spreading north.
I. TRADING IN TODAY
While the above statement may seem comical, simplistic, and biased, it
portrays a viable conservative view of NAFTA, based on the premise that
a free trade agreement cannot truly be free unless the trading partners
share roughly equal socioeconomic status. A more liberal view may
agree with this premise, but will also tend to emphasize that NAFTA has
had positive as well as negative effects. This comment examines NAFTA
and how it relates to labor law and social development in the United
States and Mexico, and postulates that NAFTA can and must be revised
to help reduce illegal immigration7 factors and improve labor and social
conditions in Mexico as well as parts of the United States.
I begin with a general discussion of North American labor, immigra-
tion, and trade agreements. I compare general aspects of economy and
labor, focusing on the United States and Mexico. This discussion will
show how the United States and Mexico bear dramatic differences re-
garding labor law, infrastructure investment, and economy in general.
Although I will focus on Mexico and the United States, I will also include
Canada for comparative purposes at various points.
I will continue by reviewing a brief history of recent illegal immigration
in the United States, concentrating on immigration occurring after the
implementation of NAFTA. While this discussion will include recent im-
2. See Jenna L. Acuff, The Race To The Bottom: The United States' Influence on
Mexican Labor Law Enforcement, 5 SAN DIEGo INT'L L.J. 387, 403 (2004).
3. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
4. Id. art. 2203.
5. Id. art. 102.
6. Andrew O'Reilly, Mexico's Drug Death Toll Double What Reported, Expert Ar-
gues, Fox NE~ws LATINO (Aug. 10, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/
2012/08/10/mexico-drug-death-toll-double-what-reported-expert-argues. It is gen-
erally accepted that more than 50,000 people were murdered in Mexico between
2006-2012 as a result of drug cartel violence, but some claim the true number may
be closer to 100,000. Id.
7. 1 have chosen the term "illegal immigration" and the correlating term "illegal im-
migrant" because the latter represents a fair compromise between "illegal alien"
and "unauthorized immigrant" and is more accurate than the term "undocu-
mented immigrant." I use this term to encompass the entire illegal immigrant pop-
ulation; "most statistical sources" estimate 60% of this population to have entered
the USA illegally, and 40% to have remained beyond prescribed legal limits. Vic-
toria Slater, "To Govern Is To Populate": Argentine Immigration Law and What It
Can Suggest for the United States, 31 Hous. J. INT'L L. 693, 725 (2009).
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migration trends, it will not provide a detailed historical account of immi-
gration or a comprehensive review of immigration law.
To round out this background analysis, I will discuss free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) and their evolution, particularly regarding the inclusion of
labor law provisions. As we will see, this is a relatively young practice;
NAFTA, effective in 1994, was the first North American trade agreement
to include labor rights provisions.8 This discussion will examine key pro-
visions of NAFTA, as well as more recent U.S. trade agreements.
Once I have established a sound background of North American labor
law, immigration, and trade agreements, I will analyze their interplay-
focusing on NAFTA-and address policy considerations they affect. I
will argue that illegal immigration has tended to inhibit union activity,
particularly in the United States, and that NAFTA has exacerbated the
problem by creating an atmosphere that encourages more people to flee
Mexico and illegally enter the United States. At the same time, NAFTA
has not lived up to its potential to protect labor rights. This further dis-
courages union activity and reduces labor standards.
I will draw on this background to assert that labor, immigration, and
trade are so interrelated that any trade agreement must necessarily in-
clude explicit labor provisions, and that nations entering free trade agree-
ments have a duty to assist less-developed partner nations. Trade
agreements are built on economic principles, but they should not be
thought of as strictly economic vehicles. I suggest that trade agreements
can and must be used to create and enforce labor rights and sustainable
development among trading partners, in addition to economic develop-
ment. I will break down this contention into three separate, but related,
concepts.
First, two fundamental cultural shifts are necessary to re-think, en
masse, the nature of trade agreements. The United States must adopt a
stance that takes a more proactive approach with a view toward develop-
ment for its trading partners; the trend of including labor provisions is a
step in the right direction, and with persistence these provisions can be
enforced, expanded, and enjoyed. Mexico must also undergo a shift that
allows for adoption of new policies in trade agreements; the Mexican gov-
ernment must include more of its workers in the formal labor sector,
show a willingness to enforce its own labor standards, and build
infrastructure.
The second concept adds on the first by asserting NAFTA can and
must be revised to provide for more effective labor law enforcement, par-
ticularly in Mexico. Trade agreements since NAFTA have tended to
make efforts to include more enforceable labor provisions, and further
steps can be taken to help make this happen. These provisions can work
in conjunction with increased government commitment to labor law en-
8. Bo3 HEPPi, LABOUR? LAWS AND GLOBAL TIRADE 107 (2005); see also, ROGER
< BLANPAIN FT AL., TuE GLOBAL WORKPLACE. INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE EMPLOYMENT LAw 249 (2007).
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forcement to build relationships between labor advocates and provide
foundations for sustainable development, instead of simply granting free
market status with little to no labor law enforcement.
The third concept incorporates the first two concepts to propose (with
an emphasis on a fundamental cultural shift) that NAFTA or a new trade
agreement can improve labor conditions and reduce illegal immigration
factors much more so than the current agreement. New provisions that
offer more serious enforcement of labor standards can improve work
conditions, increase wages, and encourage unionization and free associa-
tion. They can also provide an environment that helps foster sustainable
development in Mexico. Although amending NAFTA will not in and of
itself cure all of the problems in North America, it promises to help con-
tribute to a system that encourages labor unions to develop, discourages
illegal immigration, and enhances the quality of life for workers through-
out North America.
II. GENERAL ASPECTS OF LABOR, IMMIGRATION,
AND TRADE
A. ECONOMY AND LABOR IN THE USA AND MEXICO
Discussing economy and labor in North America presents interesting
challenges because the nations have such different cultural histories and
traditions, and the populations vary substantially (the United States has
about 316 million people, Canada has about thirty-five million, and Mex-
ico has about 116 million).9 The 2012 estimates placed the gross domestic
product (GDP) of the United States at $15.65 trillion, Canada at $1.77
trillion, and Mexico at $1.163 trillion.' 0 The most striking difference,
though, reveals itself in terms of gross domestic product per capita (PPP).
The United States has a PPP of about $50,000, compared to about $41,000
for Canada and $15,000 for Mexico." In addition, about 50 percent of
Mexican citizens live below the poverty line, compared to 15 percent of
American citizens and 9 percent of Canadian citizens. 12 In other words,
unfortunately, "average" Mexican citizens tend to earn far less than their
U.S. and Canadian neighbors.
The United States and Mexico also differ in terms of infrastructure.
Despite efforts to beef up infrastructure, Mexico ranks sixty-eighth out of
144 economies in terms of infrastructure development,13 with shortcom-
9. See CENTr. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, TiHE WOwo FACBOOK 2013, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last vis-




13. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESs REPORT 2012-2013, 17
(Klaus Schwab ed.) available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2012-2013 [hereinafter GLOBAL. REPORT].
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ings in transportation and education.14 By way of comparison, the
United States ranks fourteenth in infrastructure, and Canada ranks thir-
teenth.' 5 Mexico also suffers from an income disparity amongst its citi-
zens that ranks very high by international standards,16 and recent
estimates say the Mexican economy needs an annual $20 billion injection
to modernize infrastructure.' 7 To that end, the United States assisted
Mexico with about $375 million for developmental assistance in 2011,
compared to about $30 billion in assistance to other nations.' 8
The United States and Mexico also vary widely in their labor laws and
enforcement, with Mexican law tending to include more explicit labor
protections than U.S. law. For example, the Mexican Constitution con-
tains clauses such as, "[e]very person has the right to have a decent and
socially useful job,"'9 while the U.S. Constitution omits labor rights.20
But Mexico suffers two main problems with labor.
First, about 64 percent of the estimated forty million Mexican workers
toil in the "informal sector," performing unregulated work in the absence
of government protections. 21 These workers also tend to work for low
wages with minimal health and safety standards. 22 Second, although
Mexico has ratified International Labour Organization (ILO) Conven-
tion 87 (freedom of association), 23 labor unions tend to have a close rela-
tionship with government in Mexico, and the unions tend not to have the
14. Stephen Zamora, A Proposed North American Regional Development Fund: The
Next Phase of North American Integration Under NAFTA, 40 Loy. U. Cii. L.J. 93,
120, 122 (2008).
15. Gionxi. Ri'Arowr, supra note 13, at 16-17.
16. Zamora, supra note 14, at 118.
17. Id. at 132.
18. See U.S. OFFICiu Div. AssISTANci DATABASE, United States Official Develop-
ment Assistance by Country (Jan. 24, 2013), http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/
summary-reports.html.
19. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 123, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), available at http://
www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dil/CODICES/constitutions/eng/ame/mex (last
visited July 25, 2013); Acuff, supra note 2, at 391.
20. See generally U.S. CONsT.; see also Elizabeth C. Crandall, Comment, Will
NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Improve Enforce-
ment of Mexican Labor Laws?, 7 TRANSNAT'iL LAW 165, 176 (1994).
21. Roc;ER BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 209. See also INT'L FEn'N FOR HUMAN
RiGiffS, INTERNATIONAi FACf-FINDING MISSION: MExico: TilE NORi AMERI-
CAN FREE. TRADE AGRELMENT (NAFTA): Eiicrs ON HUMAN Riins 13 (2006)
[hereinafter FAcr-FINDING MISSION].
22. Catherine Kuchta-Helbling, TinE Cri. FOR INT'L PRIVAi ENTER., Background
Paper-Barriers to Participation: The Informal Sector In Emerging Democracies,
http://www.cipe.org/sites/default/files/publication-docs/informalEnglish.pdf (last
visited Aug. 15, 2013).
23. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (ILO
No. 87), Aug. 31, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; see also Ratifications of C087- Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87),
INT'L LABouR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:
11300:0::NO:11300:P11300INSTRUMENTID:312232:NO (last visited July 19,
2013).
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workers' interests in mind.2 4 Labeled "sindicatos blancos," many of these
unions exist only on paper, with no actual presence in the workplace. 2 5
Plus, independent Mexican unions face two daunting hurdles; first, they
require at least twenty workers. 2 6 This differs from the United States,
where only two workers are required to create a union.27 Second, Mexi-
can unions must register with the Secretary of Labor (for federally-gov-
erned work) or the Conciliation and Arbitration Board (for state-
governed work); neither the United States nor Canada imposes such a
requirement on unions.28 Partially as a result of these policies, Mexican
labor laws often go unenforced, labor law violations flourish, and unions
maintain a dubious presence. This portrays only a broad generalization
of these problems, but it provides a useful point of reference for compar-
ing Mexico and U.S. labor issues.
The United States has a much stronger economy and does not suffer
from such a vast percentage of the population working in the informal
sector, but it has experienced severe changes over the past several de-
cades, particularly with regard to unions.29 The debate over the value of
unions seems never-ending, but one thing remains clear: labor union
membership in the United States has decreased steadily over the past
several decades.30 The percentage of workers in unions in the private
sector reached about 30 percent in the late 1950s, but has decreased to
about 8 percent today; by contrast, Mexican union participation in the
formal sector decreased from about 30 percent in 1984 to about 20 per-
cent in 2000.31 U.S. employers tend to frown upon labor unions, instead
preferring to operate with individual "at will" employment contracts.32
In addition to declining U.S. labor participation, the United States has
refused to ratify ILO Convention 87, and the United States, Canada, and
Mexico have all failed to ratify Convention 98 (which focuses on the right
to organize and bargain collectively);3 3 these are two of the eight funda-
24. Dan La Botz, Mexico's Labor Movement in Transition, MONT-vLY REvizw, June
2005, available at http://monthlyreview.org/2005/06/01/mexicos-labor-movement-
in-transition (last visited Sept. 11, 2013).
25. See U.S. NAT'L ADMIN. OMICE, PUBLIc RiEPr'owr OF REIEvIw OF NAO SunIrssION
No. 9702 (1998). See also FAcr-FINDING MISSION, supra note 21, at 20-21.
26. Gerard Morales & Octavio Novaro, The Legal Status of Unions in Mexico and the
United States, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/medial
reports/nao/unions.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
27. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 228.
28. Id. at 228-29.
29. Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last Year,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.
html? r=0.
30. Id.
31. ROGER BLANPAIN r AL., supra note 8, at 118, 209.
32. See generally Susan Ritz, Coming To America - Cautions For The Unwary Em-
ployee, How To IN USA, http://www.howtoinusa.com/node/132#.UfsZjm0yjNt
(last visited Aug. 16, 2013).
33. Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (ILO No. 98), July 1,
1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 17; see also Ratifications of C098 - Right to Organise and Collec-
tive Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), INr'L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.
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mental ILO principles. 34 In contrast, the United States has ratified ILO
Conventions 105 (abolition of forced labor)35 and 182 (worst forms of
child labor).36 This failure to ratify ILO Conventions relating to labor
unionization, combined with dwindling U.S. labor participation, paints a
clear picture that labor unions no longer seem welcome in the United
States, and their presence in Mexico has decreased as well.
B. RECENT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE USA
While U.S. union participation has declined, the illegal immigrant pop-
ulation has increased since the implementation of NAFTA. 37 Immigra-
tion has become a global phenomenon more so than ever before, with
recent reports estimating some 200 million migrants across the globe.38
The Pew Hispanic Center (PHC) sums it up succinctly by noting, "trans-
national capital flows and economic development tend to stimulate mi-
gration." 39 While this seems logical enough, it highlights the importance
of considering immigration when analyzing trade agreements. Discussing
illegal immigration presents challenges, though, because it tends to have a
strong emotional aspect, as well as a polarizing effect. Conversations can
quickly devolve into sharp questions such as, "what part of illegal don't
you understand?" and short answers such as, "no human being is illegal."
Indeed, the international community views illegal immigration in the
United States as a peculiar American failing-akin to gun violence, the
death penalty, and homelessness. 4 0 The United States is, after all, a "na-
tion of immigrants," so conversations about illegal immigration must seek
an objective common ground.
org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11v300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRU-
MENTID:312243:NO (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
34. Conventions and Recommendations, INT'i LABOUR Oiwo., http://www.ilo.org/
global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and-
recommendations/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
35. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (ILO No. 105), June 25, 1957, 320
U.N.T.S. 291; see also Ratification of C105-Abolition of Forced Labour Conven-
tion, 1957 (No. 105), INT'i LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/
f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:1 1300:P1 1300_INSTRUMENTID:312250:NO
(last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
36. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No. 182), June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S.
161; see also Ratifications of C182 -Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
(No. 182), INT'l LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NOR-
MLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENTID:312327:NO (last vis-
ited Aug. 23, 2013).
37. Dustin Ensinger, Illegal Immigration and NAFTA, ECONOMY IN CRisis (Feb. 5,
2011), http://economyincrisis.org/content/illegal-immigration-and-nafta.
38. PEw HISPANIC CTR., RETHI'-INKING GLOnAL MIGRATIoN: NEW REALITIEs, NEW
OPPORTUNITIES, NEW CIIALLENGEs I (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://www.u.
arizona.edul-jag/POL596AlpewGlobalMigrationConf.pdf
39. Id.
40. Beth Lyon, The Unsigned UN Migrant Worker Rights Convention: Overlooked Op-
portunity to Change the "Brown Collar" Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'i L.
& Poi. 389, 448 (2010).
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The literature regarding immigration covers a broad array of view-
points, and the history of immigration in the United States runs deep.
This paper takes the position that solutions to modern concerns should
look forward, with a goal of creating conditions that minimize-if not
eliminate-push and pull factors that influence illegal immigration. In
that light, this paper will not provide a detailed historical background, but
will focus on recent trends.
Ascertaining the number of illegal immigrants in the United States
presents inherent difficulties, and a distinct debate simmers with a sole
focus on this question. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) 41 estimated the illegal immigrant population in the United States at
about 4.3 million in 1995, while the Center for Immigration Studies set
the 1995 estimate at about 5.4 million. 4 2 The INS estimated the 2000 pop-
ulation to have increased to around seven million with a projected future
growth rate of 350,000 per year, while the U.S. Census Bureau estimated
the population at eight million with a projected future growth rate of
500,000 per year.4 3 A 2004 population study estimated the population to
have increased to eleven million in 2005.44
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, the number stabilized at ap-
proximately eleven million in 2009 after peaking at twelve million in
2007.45 Others suggest that the actual number may be much higher, with
extreme views saying the number could be five times higher than generally
believed.46 Regardless of any discrepancies among these studies, they
agree in showing that the illegal immigrant population has steadily in-
creased over the past several decades, even if it may have leveled off in
recent years.4 7
Naturally, the number of children of illegal immigrants born in the
United States has also increased, with one estimate placing the 2013 total
at around five million.4 8 But, if the number of illegal immigrants is actu-
41. In 2003, "INS was abolished and its functions and its functions placed under three
agencies, USCIS, ICE, and CBP" that are all "within the newly created DHS."
U.S. CIIZENSIIIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Our History, http://www.uscis.gov/por-
tal/site/uscis/menuitem.ebl d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1 a/?vgnextoid=E00cOb89
284a321 0VgnVCM100000b92ca6OaRCRD&vgnextchannel=E00c0b89284a3210Vg
nVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated May 25, 2011).
42. CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRATION-RELATED STATISTICS 1995 (July
1995), http://www.cis.org/articles/1995/back295.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
43. Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance Enforcement
Unit, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMFLAND SECURITY, OIG-05-50, 5 (Sept. 2005).
44. Id.
45. Pi-w HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULAION: NATIONAL AND
STATE TRENDs, 2010 9 (Feb 1, 2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/re-
ports/133.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRANT TRENDS].
46. See, e.g., Dave Gibson, Just How Many Illegal Aliens Are In The United States?,
EXAMINER.COM (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/article/just-how-many-
illegal-aliens-are-the-united-states (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
47. See IMMIGRANT TRENDS, supra note 45.
48. PEw HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS: How PEw RESEARCIH
COUNTs THEM AND WHAT WE KNow ABou-r THEM (Apr. 2013), http://www.
pewresearch.org/2013/04/17/unauthorized-immigrants-how-pew-research-counts-
them-and-what-we-know-about-them/.
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ally up to five times the generally accepted estimate, then it follows that
there are in reality closer to twenty-five million U.S.-born children of ille-
gal immigrants currently residing in the United States.4 9
Unfortunately, more than 33 percent of those children lived in poverty
as recently as 2007, compared to around 18 percent of children of U.S.
citizens (U.S. born or legal immigrants).50 Plus, 25 percent had no health
insurance in 2007, compared to 14 percent of children of legal immigrants
and 8 percent of children of U.S. citizens.51 41 percent of children born
to illegal immigrants in San Diego in 1992 immediately began receiving
public assistance benefits, and over 200,000 children of illegal immigrants
received Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Food Stamps in
1995, at an estimated cost of $720 million.5 2 While the last two statistics
appear somewhat dated, they document a pattern that has persisted
throughout time.53 Perhaps the most shocking statistic, though, is that
about 29 percent of illegal immigrants between the ages of twenty-five
and sixty-five have less than a ninth-grade education, compared to just 2
percent of U.S.-born residents in the same age range, and 47 percent have
not completed high school, compared to just 8 percent of U.S.-born re-
sidents, according to a 2009 study. 54 This creates an inherent social ten-
sion in a nation that regards education as a fundamental component of a
functioning democracy.
These conditions fuel concerns that massive immigration takes jobs
from U.S. citizens, forces down wages 55 and drains the social benefit sys-
tem.5 6 While scholars hotly debate the direct economic costs, they often
ignore supplemental social and environmental effects.57 Some argue that
a major influx of illegal immigrants results in an effective importation of
the very conditions that caused those immigrants to flee their home coun-
try in the first place. Others argue that large pockets of illegal immi-
grants tend to create unintended consequences, such as increased street
gang activity, school dropout rates, and violent crime.58 Large waves of
49. See id.; Gibson, supra note 46.
50. PEw HIsP. CENTER, A PowrRAI OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN 'THEp UNfIfD
STATES 17, iv, 4 (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/re-
ports/107.pdf [hereinafter PORTRAIT].
51. Id. at 18.
52. Charles Wood, Losing control of America's Future-The Census, Birthright Citi-
zenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & Pun. Po.'v 465, 498 (1999).
53. See id., see also George J. Borjas, THE FuruRE OF CHILDREN, Poverty and Pro-
gram Participation Among Immigrant Children, Vol. 21, No. I (Spring 2011), at
255.
54. PORTRAIT, supra note 50, at 10.
55. See, e.g., Slater, supra note 7 (discussing Harvard professor Borjas estimations that
illegal immigrants decreased wages of U.S. born workers 3.2 percent between
1980-2000); see also Vernon M. Briggs, Reining in a Rogue Policy: The Imperative
of U.S. Immigration Reform, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 611, 625 (1999)
(arguing that uneducated and unskilled immigrants have reduced wages for all
workers in the lowest skill levels).
56. Slater, supra note 7, at 701.
57. Roy BECK, TIHE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 13, 15 (1996).
58. See, e.g., id. at 9, 17, 30, 111 (noting that a key concern revolves not around who
the immigrants are, but how many there are). See generally PEw HISPANIC CTR.,
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immigrants can change the atmosphere too drastically, too quickly, and
create sub-communities that propagate the imported culture and reduce
assimilation into U.S. culture.59 This also contributes to over-crowding
and harmful environmental effects. 60 Massive immigration can increase
vehicular traffic density and air pollution. Additionally, increased hous-
ing density increases noise pollution,61 and illegal immigrants trekking
across the border often disturb the natural environment and leave behind
a trail of discarded clothing, vehicles, and other debris.62
Interestingly, illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States has
arguable positive and negative effects on Mexico. On the one hand, Mex-
ico benefits by receiving substantial amounts of money from remittances
sent by those living in the United States.63 A darker view suggests Mex-
ico encourages illegal immigration as a way to reduce its population and
rid itself of the responsibility of taking care of its poorest citizens. 64 On
the other hand, illegal immigration hurts Mexico because it encourages
"brain drain."65 This occurs when intelligent workers with little opportu-
nity relocate to a location with more opportunity.66 This stalls develop-
ment because young, able-bodied citizens who could provide ideas and
labor flee to the United States instead of staying and building up their
home country.67 This also hurts those left behind, as departing workers
rip families apart, separating people from those they love the most.6 8
Immigrants unquestionably make substantial economic, cultural, and
labor contributions to the United States, and often add a refreshing ele-
ment of diversity to local communities. Many, though, flee to the United
States to escape conditions that demand attention which our society has
heretofore withheld. As it stands, current conditions within the United
States and Mexico create an atmosphere ripe for illegal immigration to
the United States, with strong effects on both nations.
BETWEEN Two WORLos: How YOUNG LATINOs COME OF AGE IN AMERICA (July
1, 2013), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportlD=1 17
[hereinafter, BETWEEN Two WORLDS].
59. See BECK, supra note 57 at 304.
60. Id. at 9, 42.
61. Id. at 42, 293, 332.
62. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., 107mIi CONG., REP. TO TI- H.R.
COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS ON IMPACS CAUSED By UNDOCUMENTED ALIENs
CROSSING FED. LANos IN SE. ARIZ. 3, 11, 20 (2002).
63. Zamora, supra note 14, at 113 (reporting remittances from the USA to Mexico
exceeded $24 billion in 2006 and account for Mexico's second largest source of
foreign exchange; these figures do not differentiate remittances based on immigra-
tion status).
64. Fox NEWS, Mexican State Issues "How to" on Border Jumping (Mar. 23, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/03/23/mexican-state-issues-how-to-on-border-
jumping/.
65. Devon Roepcke, "Should I Stay Or Should I Go?": Preventing Illegal Immigration
By Creating Opportunity In Mexico Through Microcredit Lending, 38 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 455, 477 (2008).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 477-478.
68. Id. at 478.
RACING TO THE BOTTOM
C. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS FROM NAFTA TO CAFFA
Free trade reduces restrictions, such as tariffs, on the trade of goods
and services between international partners. 69 The United States has
completed fifteen FTAs-all but NAFTA and the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have been simple bilateral agreements, and
the recent Agreements feature tariff phase-outs that extend for fifteen,
seventeen, or twenty years. 70 While this economic motivation provides
the impetus for free trade, modern agreements can and do go beyond
mere economic policy. 7' Some pegged NAFTA as a huge success because
it was the first trade agreement to include a labor provision side agree-
ment, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC). 72 The NAALC includes provisions that encourage each of
the three nations to enforce its own labor laws, sets forth a list of aspira-
tional work standards including eleven guiding principles, and establishes
procedures to bring claims against a nation that fails to enforce its labor
laws.73
The NAALC created the Commission on Labor Cooperation (CLC) to
"oversee the implementation and develop recommendations on the fur-
ther elaboration of this Agreement," inter alia. 7 4 The CLC consists of a
ministerial council and a secretariat, and receives support from the Na-
tional Administrative Office of each nation.75 The Council is comprised
of the labor minister (or its designee) from each nation, and the fifteen-
member Secretariat acts to "assist the Council in exercising its functions
and shall provide such other support as the Council may direct."76 The
Secretariat exchanges a good amount of its resources for research relating
to labor issues, and the NAALC mandates that the Secretariat make an-
nual reports of its activities and expenditures to the Council.77
Subsequent trade agreements have followed NAFTA and extended the
inclusion of labor provisions.78 The 1999 U.S.-Cambodia Trade Agree-
69. Scott L. Baier & Jeffrey G. Bergstrand, Do Free Trade Agreements Actually In-
crease Members' International Trade, 71 J.L. ECON. 72, 92.
70. OFFICE OF TIIE U.S. TRADE REREISENTATIVE, EXEc. OFFICE OF TE PRESIDENT,
FREE., TRADE. AGREEMENTs, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements (last visited Sept. 13, 2013); see, e.g., U.S.-Columbia Trade Promotion
Agreement, INT't TRADE ADMIN., http://www.trade.gov/fta/colombialindex.asp
(last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
71. See, e.g., AusTRALIAN Gov'T Pizorucrvr'ry COMM'N, RESEARCH REPORT, Bi-
LATERAL AN) REGIONAL TRAiE AGREEMENTs 35 (Nov. 2010).
72. RoGER BLANPAIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 249 (citing Boin HairrusE, LABOUR LAws
AND GIOl3Ai TRADE 107 (2005)).
73. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1, Sept.
14, 1993, 32 l.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
74. Id. art. 10(1)(a).
75. Id. art. 8(2).
76. Id. art. 9(1), art. 12(3), art. 13(l).
77. Id. art. 13(3).
78. See Mary Jane Bolle, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agree-
ments, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCII SERVICE 1 (Jan. 31, 2013), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/rnisc/RS22823.pdf.
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ment 7 9 included labor provisions in the actual Agreement and used a
quota system that allowed for increased exports depending on the attain-
ment of prescribed labor goals.80 This trade agreement provided benefits
in at least two ways: it linked trade and labor rights, and it included provi-
sions for an ILO-designed factory-monitoring program.81 On the other
hand, some have voiced concerns that the agreement provided incentives
to the Cambodian government, as opposed to individual factories, and
that negotiations took place between the United States and the ILO to
the exclusion of external non-government organizations (NGOs) and la-
bor unions. 82 This agreement expired in 2005, but has piqued interest in
international communities; for example, because of Cambodia's high la-
bor standards-which were, in fact, promulgated by the trade agree-
ment-Germany became Cambodia's second-largest consumer.83
The United States took an even larger step by signing the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 84 in 2004; CAFTA goes be-
yond the trilateral nature of NAFTA and includes Costa Rica, the Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.85
This agreement has the added benefit of establishing a Labor Coopera-
tion and Capacity Building Mechanism to "develop capacity-building ac-
tivities, exchange information on labor practices, and seek support from
international organizations." 8 6 But CAFTA contains no enforceable obli-
gation to meet international standards, and remedies are more limited
than the trade sanctions imposed by other trade agreements.87 Despite
these criticisms, CAFTA illustrates a maturing process in which labor
rights assert a more powerful presence in trade agreements.88
III. THE INTERPLAY OF LABOR, IMMIGRATION,
AND TRADE
A. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IS ONE CAUSE OF UNION DECLINE IN THE
UNITED STATES
International labor, trade, and immigration are tightly intertwined, and
any in-depth discussion of one must necessarily include discussion of the
79. Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement, U.S.-Cambodia, Jan. 20, 1999, available at
http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/M9rzdrzMKGi6AjfOSIuJRA/
uskhtexttile.pdf.
80. Kevin Kolben, Working to Improve Conditions In Cambodia's Garment Factories,
7 YAuE Hum. RTs. & Dv. L.J. 79, 80, 86 (2004).
81. Id. at 80-81.
82. Don Wells, "Best Practice" In the Regulation of International Labor Standards:
Lessons of the US-Cambodia Textile Agreement, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & Pot'y J. 357,
365-66 (2006).
83. Id. at 361, 374.
84. Central America Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 514 available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/cafta/caftadr-e/caftadrin-e.asp#PDF.
85. Michael A. Cabin, Labor Rights in the Peru Agreement: Can Vague Principles
Yield Concrete Change?, 109 Coicum. L. REv. 1047, 1061 (June 2009).
86. Id. at 1062.
87. Id. at 1063.
88. Id. at 1062.
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other two. This paradigm emphasizes a symbiotic relationship between
the three concepts that begs for recognition, because trade requires labor
to produce products and services, and trade and labor both influence im-
migration trends. One trend suggested by evidence indicates that illegal
immigration has contributed to union decline and decreased wages in the
United States over the past several decades.89
Scholars have found a controversial example at a Tar Heel hog-
processing plant in North Carolina, where illegal immigrant workers re-
placed many black American workers during the 1990-2000 time pe-
riod." Tar Heel management turned over 20,000 workers between 1993
and 1997, paid lower wages than other similar plants, and took efforts to
prevent workers from joining the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union.9' These efforts included intimidating illegal immigrants to dis-
courage them from joining the union, which helped thwart black workers
from establishing a union presence. 92 In what many viewed as a horrify-
ing example of government cruelty, many illegal immigrants were also
removed from the plant in a 2007 raid by immigration authorities. 93 A
similar raid was conducted at a Swift plant in 2006, resulting in the arrest
of 1,300 illegal immigrants. 94 Interestingly, the vacated positions result-
ing from these raids were filled relatively quickly by black American
workers, who were more likely to actively seek union representation, ob-
tain higher wages, and earn wage "bonuses."s
In another example, the New Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters
brought suit against DR Horton Construction, of Fort Worth, Texas in
2008 for allegedly laying off the union workers and replacing them with
lower cost illegal immigrants.96 The complaint further alleged that Hor-
ton illegally classified the workers as "independent contractors," and the
Horton boss allegedly said, "get rid of all the unions" because he had
people-illegal immigrant workers-willing to work "sunup to sun-
down."97 Defendants removed the case to the District Court of New
89. See generally BECK, supra note 57. Compare Briggs, supra note 55 with, Ruben J.
Garcia, Ghost Workers In An Interconnected World: Going Beyond The Dichoto-
mies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. Micii. J.L. REFORM 737,758
(2003) (arguing that Briggs' view places too much importance on immigration con-
trol at the expense of "nationally and internationally recognized rights to organize
and bargain collectively," and that "Briggs' argument is also an example of
isolationism").
90. Jerry Kammer, Labor Market Effects of Immigration Enforcement at Meat Packing
Plants in Seven States, CR. FOR IMMIGRATION SrUDIs (Nov. 2009), http://cis.org/
node/1577 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
91. HUMAN Riorrs WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERs' FRI-ooM oiF Associ-
ATrION IN THF UNITED STATI.s UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGtrrs STAN-
DARDS 127-130 (2000).
92. Id. at 135.
93. See Kammer, supra note 90.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See N.J. Reg'1 Council of Carpenters v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 08-1731 (KSH),
2010 WL 2674474 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010).
97. PR NiEWSWIRE, Homebuilder Engages in Widespread Corruption and Tax Fraud,
Carpenters Union Lawsuit Alleges, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
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Jersey where in 2011 the court dismissed plaintiff's federal claims and
remanded the case back to state court to decide the remaining claims.98
Although this would seem to be at least a small victory for Horton, the
pleadings and opinions shed light on what some consider to be common
practice throughout the current U.S. labor market.
These examples reflect what labor unions suspect-illegal immigrant
labor has undercut wages and reduced union participation.9 9 Labor un-
ions have recognized that illegal immigration tends to reduce unioniza-
tion, and many have come to lobby for immigration reform so as to
reduce the amount of illegal workers (by granting them legal status) and
encourage them to join labor unions.' 00 This fires up the immigration
debate and shows that labor union leaders recognize that illegal immigra-
tion reduces unionization, because illegal workers are less inclined to join
unions and enjoy less protection from employer abuse.
Hints of change abound, though, as more scholars, activists, and union
leaders press the U.S. government to revise its policies and illegal immi-
grants become more likely to seek unionization.101 Immigrants face diffi-
culties, though, from what could be described as disjointed U.S. legal
policy. The decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 0 2
provides a provocative example. The U.S. Supreme Court held that an
illegal worker was precluded from collecting back-pay (for work he had
not performed) after his employer illegally fired him for attempting to
exercise his right to free association, on the ground that allowing such a
remedy would inappropriately preempt U.S. immigration law. 103 This has
sparked an incessant debate amongst scholars, many of whom have noted
the hypocritical nature of a system whereby employers knowingly employ
illegal workers with a "wink and a nod" only to take advantage of those
workers by exploiting disharmony between labor and immigration law.10 4
Hoffman further illustrates the need for incorporation of U.S. labor and
immigration policy. 05
Various factors have combined to suppress unionization in the United
States over the past several decades, and illegal immigration has acted as
one of those factors. U.S. employers have hired and, in many cases,
abused illegal workers. The federal government has been unable to im-
plement a program that-in one way or another-reduces illegal immi-
grants in the United States. Although it remains difficult-if not
homebuilder-engages-in-widespread-corruption-and-tax-fraud-carpenters-union-
lawsuit-alleges-57055047.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
98. See N.J. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 08-1731 (KSH),
2011 WL 4499276 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2011).
99. See generally JULIE R. WA-FfS, IMMIGRATflON Policy and the Challenge of Global-
ization, Unions and Employers in Unlikely Alliance, 147 (2002).
100. Id. at 146.
101. See generally id. See also Garcia, supra note 89.
102. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
103. Id. at 140.
104. Garcia, supra note 89, at 744.
105. See generally Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137.
RACING TO THE BOTTOM
impossible-to measure the relative impact illegal immigration has had
on anti-unionization in the United States, it is sufficient to note that the
influence has been noticeable and substantial.
B. NAFTA INCREASES ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION FACTORS AND
FACILITATES REDUCED LABOR STANDARDS
During his first year in office in 2008, U.S. President Barrack Obama
stated, "I will work ... to fix NAFTA."10 6 He said this, in part, because
NAFTA essentially annexed Mexico as a "low-wage industrial suburb of
the United States and opened Mexican markets to heavily-subsidized
U.S. agribusiness products, blowing away local producers."107 Multina-
tional corporations made fortunes by moving production facilities to
Mexico, which offered cheap labor and nonexistent government regula-
tion.108 International giant Wal-Mart came in and undercut micro-busi-
nesses that sold shoes, candy, and toys, eliminating an estimated 28,000
small and medium-sized Mexican businesses.' 09 Unlike European mod-
els, NAFTA failed to provide the less-developed partner (Mexico) with
the means to adapt its economy, society, and institutions to the expecta-
tions of a first world economy. 10 This created huge immigration push
factors, causing massive migration both within Mexico and from Mexico
to the United States.' Unfortunately, "NAFTA failed to curb illegal
immigration precisely because it was never designed as a genuine devel-
opment program crafted to promote rising living standards . . . in
Mexico."112
This is unsurprising given that the NAALC, the labor side agreement
to NAFTA, was just that-a side agreement lacking real power. Under
the Bush administration, NAFTA originally did not include labor provi-
sions, but then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton-in what some call a
clever political move-demanded inclusion of the side agreement.1 3 Al-
though some have heralded the NAALC as a giant step forward, others
have lamented it as the "toothless tiger" because it contains weak labor
standards, lacks enforcement power, and does not establish a firm set of
international guidelines that each nation must follow.11 4 Scholars de-
scribe the labor complaint submission process as cumbersome, inefficient,
and ineffective; the process can take up to four years, and most com-
106. Paulette L. Stenzel, Free Trade and Sustainability Through the Lens of Nicaragua:
How CA FTA-DR Should Be Amended to Promote the Triple Bottom Line, 34 Wm.
& Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 653, 655 (2010).
107. Roger Bybee and Carolyn Winter, Immigration Flood Unleashed by NAFTA's
Disastrous Impact on Mexican Economy (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.common-
dreams.org/views06/0425-30.htm (last visited May 20, 2013).
108. Stenzel, supra note 106, at 697.
109. Bybee & Winter, supra note 107.
110. Fact-Finding Mission, supra note 21.
111. Id. at 9, 12.
112. Bybee & Winter, supra note 107.
113. Frank H. Bieszczat, Comment, Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements: From the
NAALC To Now, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1387, 1388 (2008).
114. Acuff, supra note 2, at 415. See also Zamora, supra note 14, at 115.
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plaints offer no substantial remedies or punitive measures.115 A telling
illustration is that the NAALC only allows dispute resolution-the pro-
cess that can lead to trade sanctions-for violations of child labor, mini-
mum wage, and health and safety regulations.116 Due to these
shortcomings, critics infer that the NAALC amounted to mere showman-
ship-little more than window dressing and political fodder for a run at
the presidency, with no real labor protections.
One way this has contributed to increased illegal immigration factors is
by devastating the Mexican agricultural sector. NAFTA has wreaked
havoc on the Mexican agricultural system because it helped reverse Mex-
ico's longstanding "food sovereignty" philosophy and allowed imported
food to compete with Mexico's local farmers. 17 For example, American-
grown corn has entered the Mexican market and driven many Mexican
farmers out of business." 8 This is because American farmers receive
government subsidies that allow them to reduce the cost of corn, thereby
artificially lowering the market price when competing against Mexican
corn." 9 This has led to an increased migration of rural Mexican farmers
to urban areas, with some two million people being forced to relocate as a
result of NAFTA.120 This creates population densities that increase the
labor pool, providing another push factor to encourage Mexican workers
to continue north into the United States.
NAFTA also increases illegal immigration factors by encouraging ille-
gal drug smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border; indeed, the Texas At-
torney General referred to it as the "North American Free Trafficking
Agreement."121 This is because drug smugglers tend to use truck cargo,
train cargo, or illegal immigrant "mules" to move drugs across the bor-
der.122 This presents a unique opportunity in that it allows the smugglers
to minimize their chance of being detected by dividing up shipments of
drugs among many "mules" to reduce the loss should any of them be
caught.123 This is but one method of transporting drugs used by ever-
increasing narco-traffickers, many of whom have set up complex business
fronts to facilitate smuggling and launder the proceeds.124 Narco-traffick-
ers also use illegal immigrants as laborers on covert marijuana farms in
115. See generally Acuff, supra note 2. See also Bieszczat, supra note 113.
116. NAALC, supra note 73, art. 27.
117. J. Patrick Larue, The "ILL-ICIT" Effects of NAFTA: Increased Drug Trafficking
Into The United States Through Its Southwest Border, 9 Currents Int'l Trade L.J.
38, 44-45 (2000).
118. Rick Relinger, NAFTA and U.S. Corn Subsidies: Explaining the Displacement of
Mexico's Corn Farmers, Prospect J. Int'l Aff. at UCSD (April 2010), available at
http://prospectjournal.ucsd.edu/index.php/2010/04/nafta-and-u-s-corn-subsidies-ex-
plaining-the-displacement-of-mexicos-corn-farmers/. See also Stenzel, supra note
106.
119. Relinger, supra note 118.
120. Fact-Finding Mission, supra note 21.
121. Larue, supra note 117, at 38.
122. Id. at 41.
123. Id. at 42.
124. Taylor W. French, Free Trade and Illegal Drugs: Will NAFTA Transform the
United States Into the Netherlands?, 38 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 501, 529 (2005).
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the United States.12 5 Free trade includes drug trade, and NAFTA has
helped open the market, providing a pull factor for illegal immigration.
Tightly connected to the increase in migration from rural areas to ur-
ban areas is the decline in working conditions in the United States and
Mexico, particularly Mexico. Some evidence suggests that large transna-
tional corporations are the true beneficiaries of NAFTA, and that
NAFTA has increased trade, but not employment. 126 Indeed, trade be-
tween the United States and Mexico "exceeds $250 billion per year, more
than four times that of a decade ago," and foreign direct investment in
Mexico has increased substantially.127 But the Mexican manufacturing
sector, its biggest exporter, offered 4.2 percent fewer jobs in 2001 than in
1993.128 This is because new jobs tend to open up at maquiladoras, with
little help extending into the Mexican economy. 1 2 9
The maquiladora system arose in 1965 as part of the Border Industriali-
zation Program (BIP) as a way to employ Mexicans returning after work-
ing in the United States under the Bracero program.130 Designed as a
system to produce goods for export, the BIP invited foreign companies to
establish production facilities and employ Mexican workers. 1 3 1 Unfortu-
nately, the maquiladora sector has become known for rampant human
rights abuses, and some have described it as a "revolving door" supplying
a continuous supply of illegal immigrants who would rather cross the bor-
der into the United States than work under maquiladora conditions.132
The maquiladora system increases push factors for illegal immigration
by drawing Mexican workers to the border area and then encouraging
them to continue north due to unemployment and undesirable working
conditions. 13 3 For example, between 2000 and 2003, the U.S. economic
troubles forced many maquila workers out of their jobs; this formed
large, informal "shantytowns, crime, and insecurity." 134 Wages have de-
creased in border factories, and employers have lowered labor standards
and working conditions-as well as actively discouraged meaningful
unionization-to remain competitive with Chinese factories.135 For ex-
125. Thomas Watkins, 2 Juveniles Arrested for Tending Pot Plantations, AssoCIATED
PRuss, Aug. 2, 2010, available at http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/Aug/02/2-
juveniles-arrested-for-tending-pot-plantations/.
126. Fact-Finding Mission, supra note 21, at 7-8. See also Stenzel, supra note 106, at
677 (arguing that, contrary to the "trickle-down theory," NAFTA has not resulted
in economic growth spreading throughout Mexico).
127. Fact-Finding Mission, supra note 21, at 6, 12.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 25.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 26.
134. Id. See also Roepcke, supra note 65, at 466 (noting dire conditions within
colonias-small villages "known for their lack of drinking water or sewage systems
and their staggering levels of poverty and disease").
135. See generally Fact-Finding Mission, supra note 21. Stating that 16-20 percent of
the border factories are unionized, but many feature "sindicatos blancos" that
serve the interests of the employer, not the employees. Id. at 19-20.
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ample, maquila employers reportedly engage in rampant pregnancy dis-
crimination, "encouraging" pregnant women to quit their jobs and giving
pregnant women harder tasks so they miscarry, all to avoid paying mater-
nity leave.136 These atrocities, and many more, have been publicized in a
1996 Human Rights Watch report, as well as a 1997 National Administra-
tive Office (NAO) submission pursuant to NAALC that resulted in a rec-
ommendation for ministerial consultations. These findings highlight an
institutional framework creating substantial incentives for workers to
move on and head north.' 37 While the NAFTA has increased trade, the
NAALC has done little to increase working conditions, enforce labor law,
or encourage unionization.
IV. NEW TRADE AGREEMENT PARADIGMS
A. Two FUNDAMENTAL CULTURAL SHiwrs MUST TAKE PLACE
Current labor conditions and illegal immigration trends point out a dire
need for social overhaul in North America. As Francis Bacon said, "[h]e
that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the
greatest innovator."138 We must look at trade in conjunction with immi-
gration and labor, and trade agreements must include economic, social,
and environmental provisions. Two fundamental cultural shifts seem nec-
essary in order to adopt a more inclusive policy.
First, the United States must recognize its role as a world leader and
borrow from European Union (EU) principles to assist its less developed
trading partners. For example, the European Regional Development
Fund and the European Social Fund provide capital to develop infra-
structure and train workers, providing more socioeconomic support for
economically disadvantaged nations.139 U.S. policy should reflect the re-
alization that trade, labor, and immigration are interrelated, and that
trade agreements should incorporate serious-minded economic, social,
and environmental elements. Proponents of unrestrained trade must
concede that while such agreements tend to facilitate economic growth,
the agreements exacerbate socioeconomic differences between and
within the member nations, often contributing to social problems includ-
ing environmental concerns and illegal immigration. These views should
be supported by more effective measures that do more than just pay lip
service to notions of improved working conditions and labor rights.
The United States should also rethink its immigration policies along
with its trade agreements because many of those policies make little
sense. The current birthright citizenship policy, which grants U.S. citizen-
136. See Michelle Smith, Potential Solutions to the Problem of Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion in Maquiladoras Operated by U.S. Employers in Mexico, 13 Berkeley Wo-
men's L.J. 195, 197-98 (1998).
137. Id. at 198, 214, 219.
138. See Francis Bacon Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors/f/francisbacon.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
139. Zamora, supra note 14, at 103-05.
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ship to U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants, seems incompatible with
"de facto" deportation. 1 4 0 But the time may soon be ripe for change in
this regard, as a 2010 survey showed htat 46 percent of registered voters
are in favor of amending the constitution to end birthright citizenship.14 1
Even if birthright citizenship continues, the U.S. government should
examine its immigration law enforcement methods. While the "Gang of
Eight" battles furiously over immigration reform,142 common sense dic-
tates that reform is useless without vigorous enforcement, and individual
states have begun to respond to concerns with federal failure to enforce
immigration law by enacting their own statutes to do so.14 3 In perhaps
the most famous case, Arizona sought to enact SB 1070 in 2010.144 The
bill made it a criminal offense to fail to comply with federal alien-registra-
tion requirements, and also made it a criminal offense for an unautho-
rized alien to seek or engage in work in the state.14 5 It authorized state
and local officers to arrest a person, without a warrant, whom "the officer
has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that
makes the person removable from the United States," and required law
enforcement officers to check immigration status-during the course of
"lawful contact"-of anyone "reasonably suspected" of being in the
country illegally. 14 6
Anticipation of the new statute led to protest rallies across the coun-
try,147 and a federal judge struck down key provisions of the statute the
day before it was to take effect.14 8 The case made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which in 2012 declared most of the key provisions to be
pre-empted by federal law but upheld the portion allowing police to in-
vestigate the immigration status of an individual stopped, detained, or
arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that such individual is in the
country illegally. 149 Regardless of the ruling, the case highlights the con-
140. See Amanda Colvin, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: Realities of De
Facto Deportation and International Comparisons Toward Proposing a Solution, 53
St. Louis U. L.J. 219 (de facto deportation occurs when a U.S. citizen child's illegal
immigrant parents are deported, leaving the child in the United States, separated
from the parents).
141. Immigrant Trends, supra note 45, at 14.
142. S. 744, 113th Cong. 1st Sess. (Ariz. 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BILLS-113s744es/pdf/BILLS-113s744es.pdf (titled the "Border Security, Eco-
nomic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act," this 800 page document
faces numerous revisions and amendments); John Parkinson, House Immigration
'Gang of Eight' Finalizing Own Overhaul, ABC Ni;ws (Apr. 15, 2013, 3:22 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/04/house-immigration-gang-of-eight-fi-
nalizing-own-overhaul.
143. See Ariz. Legis. Serv., Ch. 113 (S.B. 1070), 49th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010),§ 1.
144. See generally id.
145. Id. §§ 13-1509, 13-2928.
146. Id. H§ 11-051, 13-3883.
147. See, e.g., Zina Kumok, Immigrant Groups Protest Outside MLB Headquarters, As-
SOCIATED PRESs, July 8, 2010, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?id=
5365142.
148. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp.2d 980 (D. Ariz., 2010).
149. United States v. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-2510 (2012).
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tentious nature of current immigration policy and shows the need for the
federal and state governments to act in a cooperative manner in crafting
sensible courses of action for the future.
As immigration connects so intimately with labor and trade, the United
States must find a more workable solution to handle its immigration is-
sues while Mexico develops a more sustainable economy and infrastruc-
ture. Mexico, on the other hand, must incorporate more of its workforce
into the formal sector and allow independent unions to compete in the
workplace. The former requires job creation, which in turn requires fur-
ther infrastructure development, and the latter calls for Mexico to make it
easier for independent unions to register. To this end, Mexico could take
two relatively easy steps. First, it could abolish the requirement mandat-
ing a minimum of twenty workers to establish a union.150 While this re-
quirement has little effect on large employers, it effectively prevents
workers of smaller employers from exercising their right to free associa-
tion. Second, Mexico could eliminate the requirement that unions regis-
ter with the Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare (for federally-
governed work) or the Conciliation and Arbitration Board (for state-gov-
erned work). 151 Neither of the other two North American nations shares
this requirement, and it presents an unnecessary official barrier to unioni-
zation. The Mexican government must also show a willingness to enforce
its own labor law, and the United States must show more of a willingness
to require-rather than simply encourage-Mexico to do so in order to
enjoy the benefits that free trade has to offer.
B. NAFTA NEEDS TO BE REDRAFTED TO LOOK AT FREE TRADE AS
THE GOAL, NOT THE GIVEN, AND INCLUDE A MANDATORY
FOUR-YEAR REVIEW
The United States has made progress with its trade agreements in that
the agreements have included labor provisions and purportedly provide
developmental assistance and environmental protections. On the other
hand, many, if not most of those provisions tend to go unenforced, even if
they meet or exceed international standards. The agreements, then, must
provide more powerful enforcement provisions and must view "free"
trade as the goal, not the given, based on the premise that trade agree-
ments must provide diligent attention to economic, social, and environ-
mental concerns.
The United States-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement provides an
example of a model agreement because it increased quotas depending on
whether labor goals are met, rather than doing so simply as a matter of
150. See NAO: NALC SUBMISSION 940001 AND) 940002: APPENDICES, UNIfED STATIES
DEPARTMENT OF LA3OR: BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS, available
at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/940001app.htm (last visited Sept. 16,
2013).
151. See id.
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course. 15 2 This use of positive incentives created a goal to work towards,
as opposed to a system of penalties. The United States-Jordan Agree-
ment 5 3 of 2002 also provides some direction, because it shows that labor
provisions within the Agreement itself, combined with oversight and pub-
licity, can exert pressure on a particular nation to improve labor condi-
tions. Less than a month after the New York-based National Labor
Committee released a report detailing atrocities in Jordan factories, the
Jordanian government took action to improve conditions.154 These ac-
tions included meeting with representatives from each of the companies
operating in the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) and drafting a plan
to freeze guest worker programs until labor problems were resolved.' 55
Achievements such as these illustrate potential for trade agreements to
help resolve labor problems and increase labor standards.
With a fundamental cultural shift in Mexico and the United States,
NAFTA can be redrafted or replaced with a new type of trade agreement.
As commentators have noted, a new agreement should include labor pro-
visions in the body of the agreement itself, provide a less cumbersome
complaint submission process, and amend Article 27 of NAALC to in-
clude dispute resolution for all labor violations, not just those stemming
from violations of child labor, minimum wage, and occupational health
and safety regulations.156 This would give more teeth to NAALC and
give more serious consideration to all labor principles.
Another possible step is to amend Article 10 of NAALC to include
mandatory four-year reviews, including public comments. Article 10
states that the CLC shall, within four years, "review [the agreement's]
operation and effectiveness in the light of experience," but gives no fur-
ther instruction regarding the nature of that review or whether to conduct
further reviews.157 The CLC conducted its mandated review in 1998, and
included a section featuring public comments. 158 Much of the content of
that review, as well as the accompanying comments, expresses thoughts
echoed in this comment regarding NAALC. Specifically, the report
stated, "[t]he Council is convinced, along with many observers and par-
ticipants in this review, that there remains much more yet to be gained in
152. Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-Made Fiber, Non-Cotton Veg-
etable Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Royal Government of Cambodia,
U.S.-Cambodia, Jan. 1, 1999, available at http://cambodia.usembassy.gov/uploads/
images/M9rzdrzMKGi6AjfOSIuJRA/uskhtexttile.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
153. See Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24,
2000, 41 I.L.M. 63.
154. Blanpain et al., supra note 21, at 274.
155. Id.
156. RiEvIE-w OF iiE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMINT ON LABOR COOPERATION
1994-1997, COMM'N FOR LABOR COOPERATION, pt. 2 (Sept. 18, 1997), available at
http://new.naalc.org/index.cfm?page=232; see also NAALC, supra note 73, art. 27.
157. NAALC, supra note 73, art. 10(1)(a).
158. REVIEW OF THE NoiRii AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION
1994-1997, COMM'N roR LAB3OIR COOPERATION, pt. 1(A), pt. 2(A) (Sept. 18,
1997), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/review.shtml.
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achieving the objectives of NAALC by more substantive and increased
international cooperation."159
Public comments, from groups including the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), character-
ized NAALC as largely ineffective due to its cumbersome complaint sub-
mission process, limitation on dispute resolution, and general lack of
enforcement of labor law.160 The Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights
comment expressed concern that the secretariat budget totals $2 million
per year, which was less than a quarter than that allocated for the
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement.161 On the other hand, the re-
view yielded at least one positive outcome in that the CLC agreed to
conduct another review of NAALC four years later to "continue to moni-
tor the effectiveness of this Agreement." 162
That second review, conducted in 2002, lacked the force of the first
review in part because it did not include public comments.163 Public com-
ments carry weight because they draw attention to shortcomings in the
agreement, provide a forum for further discussion of labor issues, and
afford victims of labor violations a last chance to "tell their stories." Such
comments do not provide a direct remedy for labor violations, but they
encourage information exchange and foster an environment conducive to
change.
A quick look at the CLC website shows a surprising dearth of recent
activity and highlights the passive nature the CLC has seemed to adopt.
But the CLC did release a report in 2010 regarding migrant workers'
rights164 as well as a statement in 2010 stating that the office of the Secre-
tariat would be temporarily closed "as part of broader discussions ...
with the goal of establishing a consensus approach to improving the func-
tioning of the Secretariat as well as to ensure that the organization can
more effectively and efficiently fulfill its obligations under the
NAALC."' 65 But there is no mention of further activity or a new forum
for public input.166 The NAALC should be amended to make such public
input a mandatory provision of the four-year NAALC review.
159. Id. pt. 1(C).
160. Id. at annex 5.
161. Id.
162. Id. part 1(A).
163. LINDA DELP ET AL., UCLA Ctr. for Labor Research and Educ., NAFTA's LABOR
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HEALTi & SAFET1Y CASEs, 16 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.labor.ucla.edu/
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164. Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, Migrant Workers' Rights in North America
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visited May 20, 2013).
166. See generally id.
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The four-year reviews should also be mandatory because such a change
would create a sense of formalism and obligate the CLC to continue the
reviews. The current provision symbolizes the nature of the entire
Agreement in that it renders further reviews optional (thus undermining
their importance), adding to the "toothless tiger" appearance.167
Mandatory reviews would add more "bite" because they would serve to
remind the CLC that it has a duty to scrutinize the NAALC and improve
it where necessary. The reviews would also place more pressure on the
CLC to respond to public comments that highlight shortcomings of
NAALC, and would indicate how effectively the CLC has responded to
those shortcomings.
Potential drawbacks to a mandatory review every fourth year-with
the inclusion of public comments-include the argument that such a re-
quirement would do little to improve labor law enforcement as mandated
by NAALC. This argument extends to assert that without substantive
amendments (such as including all labor violations for dispute resolu-
tion), NAALC will remain ineffective, regardless of how often the CLC
reviews it. In response to this concern, it is important to realize that such
a minor amendment must work in conjunction with larger, more substan-
tive amendments to fortify NAALC and give it more real power. Plus,
mandatory reviews with public comments would send a signal that
NAALC can be amended not only to offer enhanced labor protections,
but also to facilitate the continued operation and effectiveness of the
CLC.
V. Trading for Tomorrow
History examines civilizations by their allocation of resources, among
other things. When one nation has a valuable resource that the whole
world could use-whether raw latex or an abundance of labor-other na-
tions are accountable for the methods they use to capitalize on that re-
source. Fair and just agreements must consider the effects such
agreements have on not only the economy, but also on the environment
and the overall social climate.
In addition to redrafting labor provisions in NAALC, the United States
and Mexico must work to find ways to develop infrastructure and create
jobs in Mexico. Mexico has been reluctant to accept assistance from the
United States in the past, and the current U.S. economic conditions seem
to preclude additional expenditures, but hope yet remains. The United
States could divert some of its developmental aid from other nations to
Mexico; it would seem to make sense to devote more resources to a na-
167. See NAALC, supra note 73, art. 10(1)(a) (requiring the Council to only review the
Agreement within four years after it commenced); REVIEW OF THE NORTH AMER-
ICAN AGREFMENT ON LABOR CoorERATION 1994-1997, COMM'N FOR LAnoR Co-
OPERATION, pt. 1(A), available at http://new.naalc.org/index.cfm?page=231#
FutureReviews (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (discussing the need for periodic re-
view, but stating that the Council has only agreed to a review of the Agreement in
2002).
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tion that borders the United States than on nations halfway around the
world, and it would certainly help Mexico to develop infrastructure and
create more employment opportunities for its citizens. Considering that
Mexico is currently under what some describe as a state of siege, the time
appears ripe for the United States to provide more developmental assis-
tance and for Mexico to accept it.
Redrafting NAFTA will take much time and effort, in addition to a
political climate shift, which may indeed be happening now. While
amending NAFTA will not in and of itself solve all the problems in North
America, it can work in conjunction with other developments to provide
an impetus for the improvement of labor and general social conditions.
Discussion must find middle ground between blind immigrant romanti-
cism and overzealous nationalistic xenophobia, as well as between pure
"open market" liberalism and "fierce nationalist" protectionism. Imple-
mentation must be forward-looking and in conjunction with other policy
shifts (reducing "push" and "pull" factors of illegal immigration) to build
a system that encourages controlled legal immigration and allows labor
unions to grow and develop a more consistent presence in the United
States, as well as Mexico, and to put the brakes on the race to the bottom.
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